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• An essential part of the Bank of Canada’s
inﬂation-control strategy is a ﬂexible exchange
rate that is free to adjust to various developments
in the Canadian and world economies. The
Bank of Canada does not set a target for the
exchange rate.
• A change in the Bank’s target for the overnight
interest rate generally leads to a change in the
exchangeratewhich,inturn,altersinternational
relative prices and changes net exports and
aggregate demand. The exchange rate is an
integral part of the transmission mechanism.
• When the exchange rate changes for reasons
unrelated to a change in domestic monetary
policy, the cause of the change must be
identiﬁed in order to determine the appropriate
monetary policy action. A central challenge for
the Bank is to determine the cause and
persistence of the change in the exchange rate
and the likely net effect on aggregate demand.
The Bank can then design the appropriate
policy action consistent with its objective of
keeping inﬂation low, stable, and predictable.
• A complication of monetary policy is that
observed changes in the exchange rate are often
the result of multiple changes in the Canadian
or world economies. In these situations, the
Bank must determine the relative importance
of the various forces affecting the exchange rate
and their combined effect on the Canadian
economy.
* Christopher Ragan is an Associate Professor of Economics at McGill
University. He was Special Adviser at the Bank of Canada from September
2004 to August 2005.
luctuations in Canada’s exchange rate are a
popular topic in discussions of the Canadian
economy and of the Bank of Canada’s mone-
tary policy. Movements in the exchange rate
have important implications for the Canadian economy,
but views differ as to how the Bank should respond to
them. Those apparently in favour of a strong currency
argue that the Bank should prevent substantial depre-
ciations of the Canadian dollar. Others appear to
favour a weaker currency when they argue that the
Bank should act to prevent significant appreciations
of the dollar. Both arguments assume that there is a
“right” value for the Canadian exchange rate and that
the Bank should prevent the actual exchange rate
from straying too far from this value.
A non-technical explanation of how the exchange rate
ﬁts into the Bank’s framework for monetary policy is
presented in this article.1 Four key points are made.
First, a ﬂexible exchange rate is an essential part of the
Bank’s overall policy framework—within which it
acts to keep inflation low, stable, and predictable.
Second, the Bank does not target any speciﬁc value for
the exchange rate. Third, changes in the exchange rate
are very important for the conduct of monetary policy
because (i) such changes often reflect events in Canada
or abroad that have a direct inﬂuence on the Canadian
economy; and (ii) changes in the exchange rate cause
adjustments in relative prices that, in turn, inﬂuence
the Canadian economy. Fourth, following any given
change in the exchange rate, the appropriate response
1. This article is a much condensed version of a forthcoming Bank of Canada
Working Paper, “The Exchange Rate and Canadian Inflation Targeting,”
which provides background to a speech made by Governor Dodge on
17 February 2005 (available at www.bankofcanada.ca). Both were written
while I was the visiting Special Adviser at the Bank of Canada. I wish to
thank many people for very valuable comments on earlier drafts, including
Bob Fay, Donna Howard, Peter Howitt, Paul Jenkins, Tiff Macklem, John
Murray, Dale Orr, and James Powell. This article and the Working  Paper
represent my own view on thetopic and should not be interpreted as the official
view of the Bank of Canada. All errors are mine.
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for monetary policy depends crucially on the cause of
the change. Only by identifying the reason for the
change is it possible to determine the net impact on
Canadian aggregate demand and thus the appropriate
response, if any, for monetary policy.




contribution to the overall well-being of Canadians.
Based on a large body of theoretical and empirical
research, the Bank’s policies (and those of most other
central banks) are grounded in two essential proposi-
tions:
1. high inﬂation is damaging to the economy
and costly for individuals and ﬁrms; and
2. monetary policy is unable to have system-
atic and sustained effects on any economic
variables other than the rate of inﬂation.
These two propositions are the basis for the Bank’s
policy objective of maintaining low, stable, and pre-
dictable inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, the Bank aims to keep
the annual rate of inflation of the consumer price
index (CPI) at 2 per cent, the midpoint of a target
range of 1 to 3 per cent. In practice, given the volatility
of the prices of speciﬁc products, the Bank pays partic-
ularly close attention to the behaviour of “core” inﬂa-
tion, which is derived by stripping out the eight most
volatile elements2 from the broader measure of CPI
inﬂation and adjusting the remaining components for
the effects of changes in indirect taxes.
The transmission mechanism
The Bank’s commitment to maintaining low, stable,
and predictable inflation is essential for influencing
firms’ and households’ expectations of future inflation.
Faced with a shock that pushes inﬂation either above
or below the inflation target, Canadian firms and
households are confident that the Bank will take
actions to bring inﬂation back to the 2 per cent target.
As a result, they are less likely to allow the current
shock to alter their expectations of future inflation—
their expectations tend to be well anchored.
The importance of well-anchored inflation expectations
is best illustrated by recalling what happens when
2. The eight most volatile components are fruit, vegetables, gasoline, fuel oil,
natural gas, intercity transportation, tobacco, and mortgage-interest costs.
such anchoring is not present, as in the 1970s and
1980s. During those years, inflation was difficult to
control because economic shocks led to adjustments
in expectations which, in turn, led to behaviour that
influenced actual inflation. An important lesson learned
since the early 1990s, in Canada and elsewhere, is that
keeping inflation expectations anchored at the 2 per
cent target is important for keeping actual inﬂation low
and relatively stable.
The Bank’s commitment to
maintaining low, stable, and
predictable inﬂation is essential for
inﬂuencing ﬁrms’ and households’
expectations of future inﬂation.
Chart 1 is a simpliﬁed illustration of the transmission
mechanism for monetary policy. To illustrate how it
works, consider a situation where the Bank expects
strong demand growth to push inflation above the
2 per cent target. The Bank’s appropriate policy response
is to tighten monetary policy in order to slow the growth
of aggregate demand and prevent inflation from rising
Bank of Canada sets its target for the overnight interest rate
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above the target. How does the Bank achieve this
objective?
It begins by increasing the target for the overnight
interestrate.Tworesponsesareexpected,assumingno
other economic shocks occur. First, there will generally
be an increase in longer-term interest rates. Second,
rising interest rates in Canada attract mobile ﬁnancial
capital, which increases the demand for the Canadian
dollar and causes it to appreciate relative to other cur-
rencies.
The policy-driven increase in interest rates slows the
growth in demand for consumer durables and business
investment; the associated appreciation of the Canadian
dollar reduces the expansion of exports and boosts
imports. The combined effect is a reduction in the
growth of aggregate demand for Canadian goods and
services. Since the economy’s level of total output,
gross domestic product (GDP), is determined in the
short run by the level of aggregate demand, the reduc-
tion in the growth of demand caused by the Bank’s
policy action causes a slowing of aggregate output.
With some underlying trend growth rate of the econ-
omy’slevelofproductivecapacity(“potentialoutput”),
the reduction in the growth rate of GDP implies a wid-
ening of the output gap—the difference between
actual output and potential output.
The final step in the transmission mechanism is the
link from the output gap to the rate of inﬂation. If the
slowing of actual output causes the level of actual
GDP to fall below potential output, firms are producing
below their capacity. This state of excess supply is
eventually felt in the markets for labour and other
inputs, and it leads to reductions in wages and other
factor prices (or reductions in their rate of growth).
These lower costs for inputs then contribute to a
reduction in the rate of inflation relative to what
would have occurred had the Bank not tightened its
policy.
The increase in longer-term interest rates and the
appreciation of the Canadian dollar also have a more
immediate effect on inflation unrelated to their influence
on aggregate demand. As interest rates rise, the cost of
home mortgages increases, pushing up the prices of
some components of the CPI. As the Canadian dollar
appreciates, the price of imported consumer goods
falls, reducing the prices of other components of the
CPI, an effect known as exchange rate pass-through.Both
effects are observed relatively quickly but are also
quite modest in magnitude. They are shown with
dashed lines in Chart 1.
Considerable time lags exist between the time of the
Bank’s policy actions; changes in quantities such as
consumption, investment, and net exports; the full
impact on aggregate output; and the eventual effect
on the rate of inﬂation. The Bank currently estimates
that it takes between 12 and 18 months before most of
the effect from a policy action on aggregate output is
observed, and between 18 and 24 months before most
of the effect on inﬂation occurs. And even these esti-
mates are subject to considerable variation.
The role of the exchange rate
It is clear from Chart 1 that policy actions by the Bank
will have their intended effect on aggregate demand
and inflation only if they also have their intended
effect on interest rates and the exchange rate. In other
words,monetarypolicyworks,inpart,through its effect
on the exchange rate.
Exchange rates do not change only because of monetary
policy actions, however. Shocks to foreigners’ demand
for Canadian goods or services, as well as shifts in global
asset portfolios away from or towards Canadian assets,
can also cause the exchange rate to change. In general,
it is helpful to remember that exchange rates are sim-
ply the price of one country’s currency in terms of
the currency of another country, and this relative price
is determined in the world’s foreign exchange markets,
which in turn are inﬂuenced by the global demand for
supplies of goods, services, and assets. Changes in
ﬂexible exchange rates are therefore market adjust-
ments to underlying changes in some element of the
world economy, changes that may be driven by mone-
tary policy or by numerous other factors.
The exchange rate is not a policy target
The exchange rate is important to monetary policy
for two reasons. First, monetary policy works partly
through its effect on the exchange rate, as Chart 1
illustrates. Second, most changes in the exchange rate
are caused by economic shocks of various types, and
the change in the exchange rate therefore provides
valuable information about developments in the
Canadian and global economies.
Under the Canadian regime of ﬂexible exchange rates,
the value of the exchange rate is determined by market
forces. As a result, there is no time-invariant “right”
value for the exchange rate—or, more correctly, the
current value of the exchange rate is the right value in
the sense that it reflects changes in demand or supply
conditions in the world’s foreign exchange markets. The44 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2005
products. Three examples, each leading to an appreci-
ation of the Canadian dollar, illustrate the point (the
opposite shock in each case would cause a Type One
depreciation):
1. an increase in world demand for Canadian-
produced goods and services;
2. an increase in the world prices of raw mate-
rials (caused by either growing world
demand or reductions in supply by non-
Canadian producers), which leads to an
increase in the income of Canadian com-
modity exporters; and
3. a ﬂow of ﬁnancial capital into Canada that
ﬁnances new investment in Canadian phys-
ical capital (“greenﬁeld” investment).
The ﬁrst example is the simplest. An increase in world
demand for Canadian products relative to the demand for
other countries’ products creates an increase in the
relative demand for the Canadian dollar, causing it to
appreciate against other currencies. The second exam-
ple involves an increase in the prices of many of the
products exported by Canada; it is an improvement in
Canada’s terms of trade and a special case of the ﬁrst
example. This increase in income to Canada’s exporters
again represents a direct positive shock to Canadian
aggregate demand, and it will cause an appreciation
of the Canadian dollar. The third example illustrates
that not all Type One exchange rate changes originate
on the current account of the balance of payments.
Suppose entrepreneurs rely on foreign financial capital
to finance new investment projects in Canada. The
new investment is a direct positive shock to Canadian
aggregate demand; the inflow of financial capital
increases the demand for domestic currency and
causes an appreciation of the Canadian dollar.
Direct and relative-price effects on
aggregate demand
An appreciation of the Canadian dollar, by changing
the relative prices of domestic and foreign products,
leads to substitution in spending. Both Canadian and
foreign consumers are led to substitute away from the
now relatively more expensive Canadian goods and
services towards the now relatively less expensive for-
eign products. In other words, by changing international
relative prices, an appreciation of the Canadian dollar
leads to a decrease in Canadian exports and an increase
in Canadian imports.
Thus there are two distinct effects on Canadian aggre-
gatedemandwithaTypeOneappreciation.Attheinitial
exchange rate may rise or fall in the future as events or
policies change, both in Canada and abroad. But
when the exchange rate is determined in free markets
by the actions of millions of participants in hun-
dreds of countries, it makes little sense to think of
today’s rate as being either “too low” or “too high.”
There is no time-invariant “right”
value for the exchange rate—or, more
correctly, the current value of the
exchange rate is the right value in the
sense that it reﬂects changes in
demand or supply conditions.
The Bank views any change in the exchange rate as a
reflection of some underlying change in world markets
and also recognizes that the change will itself have
effects on the Canadian economy. Since the Bank’s
policy goal is to keep inﬂation at its 2 per cent target, it
must determine the source of any persistent change in
the exchange rate in order to understand how the
underlying shock will affect the future path of aggre-
gate demand, output, and inﬂation. Only then can it
hope to design a policy that can, if necessary, offset the
effects of the shock in an attempt to meet its inﬂation
objectives. But the exchange rate is not a policy target
for the Bank of Canada.
Type One Exchange Rate Movements
In what follows, it is useful to remember that exchange
rates change when shocks have different effects on one
country than on another. For example, when we con-
sider a shock that increases the demand for Canadian
goods and services, and argue that it will tend to
cause the Canadian dollar to appeciate, we really
mean that the shock increases the demand for Canadian
products relative to those from other countries.
Deﬁning Type One exchange rate
movements
We deﬁne Type One appreciations of the Canadian
dollar as those caused by economic shocks that effect a
direct increase in the demand for Canadian goods and
services. Similarly, Type One depreciations are caused
by shocks that directly reduce the demand for Canadian45 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2005
value of the exchange rate, the shock itself represents
a direct increase to aggregate demand—the direct
effect. But the shock also causes an appreciation
which, by changing relative prices, leads to a reduction
in net exports and aggregate demand. This is the rela-
tive-price effect. The overall net effect on aggregate
demand is given by the sum of the direct and relative-
price effects, which is generally not zero.
A deﬁning characteristic of Type One
exchange rate movements is that the
direct effect and the relative-price
effect push aggregate demand in
opposite directions.
A deﬁning characteristic of Type One exchange rate
movements, therefore, is that the direct effect and the
relative-price effect push aggregate demand in opposite
directions; the movements in the exchange rate help to
dampen or absorb the effects of the initial shock to
aggregate demand.
Implications for monetary policy
Owing to the time lags in the transmission mechanism,
it is undesirable for the Bank to respond to exchange
rate movements that are expected to be short lived.
The effects on the economy are likely to be small, and
any effects from a monetary policy response would
probably occur only after the effects of the shock had
disappeared. For this reason, as difﬁcult as it is to do
in practice, the Bank attempts to “see through” short-
lived exchange rate changes and to focus only on per-
sistent changes.
The appropriate policy response to a change deter-
mined to be persisent and Type One depends on the
overall net effect on aggregate demand. Consider the
case of an increase in world commodity prices that
causes the Canadian dollar to appreciate. The direct
effect is a positive shock to aggregate demand; the
relative-price effect crowds out net exports and thus
dampensthedirecteffect.Inthetypicalcase,theoverall
net effect on aggregate demand will still be positive,
and thus monetary tightening by the Bank of Canada
will be appropriate.
Chart 2 shows the results of simulating the effects of
a temporary 10 per cent increase in real commodity
prices in the Bank’s new projection model, TOTEM (for
Terms of Trade Economic Model). TOTEM can be used
topredict theeffectsof shocksonthe Canadianeconomy
and to analyze the effects of monetary policy actions.
The model can also be used to examine the aggregate
demand consequences of external shocks to the
demand for goods and services or shocks to the risk
premium on Canadian assets—that is, it can be used
to explore the different consequences of Type One and
Type Two forces.3
Panel A shows the time path of the underlying shock
to commodity prices: a sharp 10 per cent increase that
dissipates fully over four years. Panel B shows the
resulting appreciation of the Canadian dollar. (The
nominal exchange rate is measured as the Canadian-
dollar price of one unit of foreign currency, so a reduc-
tion in the exchange rate is an appreciation of the
Canadian dollar.) Panels C and D show that commodity
exports rise significantly, whereas manufactured
exports, facing the headwinds of the stronger currency,
are adversely affected. Total exports nonetheless
increase markedly in Panel E, and this increase con-
tributes to a boost in GDP, which leads to an increase
in the output gap, as seen in Panel F (imports, not
shown, rise in response to the appreciation, but net
exports increase). Since output is determined by
demand in the short run, the increase in GDP reveals
that the net effect on aggregate demand of the Type
One appreciation is indeed positive. The opening of a
positive output gap implies the creation of excess
demand in the Canadian economy. Monetary policy
responds to this shock by raising the target for the
overnight interest rate (Panel G). Despite the policy
action, the excess demand results in an increase in the
rate of core CPI inﬂation (Panel H), but the effect is
reversed relatively quickly as inflation returns to its
initial level within three years.
Type Two Exchange Rate Movements
Deﬁning Type Two exchange rate
movements
A Type Two exchange rate movement is associated
with an underlying economic shock that does not
impinge directly on the Canadian market for goods
and services. Rather, any effect on Canadian aggregate
demand or supply works through the exchange rate
change itself. To illustrate, we consider three examples
3. TOTEM is currently a candidate for replacing the Quarterly Projection
Model (QPM), the Bank’s main model for projection and policy analysis.46 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2005
H. Core inﬂation G. Nominal policy interest rate
D. Manufactured exports C. Commodity exports
Chart 2
Type One Appreciation Caused by a Temporary Increase in Commodity Prices
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of shocks that would cause the Canadian dollar to
appreciate (the opposite shock in each case would
cause a Type Two depreciation):
1. an adjustment in domestic or international
ﬁnancial portfolios away from foreign
assets and towards Canadian assets;
2. a ﬂow of ﬁnancial capital into Canada to
ﬁnance the purchase of existing physical
capital (“brownﬁeld” investment); and
3. a multilateral depreciation of the currency
of a major trading partner required to
resolve its existing current account deﬁcit.
In the ﬁrst two examples, the increase in demand for
Canadian assets—either financial assets or existing
physical assets—leads to an increase in the demand
for Canadian dollars on foreign exchange markets,
causing the Canadian dollar to appreciate. Both involve
flows of financial capital and transactions in the
capital account of Canada’s balance of payments. In
the third example, an appreciation of the Canadian
dollar may be driven by the expectations of ﬁnancial
market participants, who see a Canadian-dollar
appreciationaspartofaglobalrealignmentofcurrencies
required to resolve existing current account imbalances.
Note that such adjustments may reﬂect less about the
sustainability of Canada’s international position than
about the multilateral currency adjustments required to
resolve imbalances among other countries. Note also
that such expectations-driven currency adjustments
need not involve actual financial flows between
countries.
A Type Two exchange rate movement
is associated with an underlying
economic shock that does not
impinge directly on the Canadian
market for goods and services.
Only relative-price effects on aggregate
demand
In none of these three examples is there a direct impact
on the demand for Canadian goods and services and
hence on Canadian aggregate demand. This absence
of any direct effect is the deﬁning feature of Type Two
movements in the exchange rate. But, as with Type One
changes, the appreciation of the Canadian dollar in
each case leads to a change in international relative
prices, increasing the relative price of Canadian prod-
ucts while decreasing the relative price of foreign
products. Thus, consumers in Canada and the rest of
the world are led to substitute away from relatively
more expensive Canadian goods towards relatively
less expensive foreign goods. This relative-price effect
leads to a fall in Canadian net exports and thus to a
reduction in Canadian aggregate demand.
Type One exchange rate changes create two distinct
effects—the direct effect on aggregate demand is par-
tially offset by the relative-price effect. Type Two
changes, however, have only one effect—the relative-
price effect. With no direct effect on aggregate
demand, the overall net effect on aggregate demand is
determined solely by the relative-price effect.
Implications for monetary policy
As we said in our discussion of Type One changes,
it is undesirable for the Bank to respond to short-lived
changes in the exchange rate. And changes caused by
Type Two forces, which often derive from changes in
investors’ perceptions about relative asset qualities,
frequently last for only short periods before being
reversed. Thus, faced with an apparent Type-Two-
induced change, it is especially important for the
Bank to assess the likely persistence of the shock.
Chart 3 shows a simulation from the TOTEM model in
which the underlying economic shock is a decrease in
the perceived risk premium on Canadian financial
assets. This shock reflects a special Type Two appre-
ciation  constructed to give the same initial exchange
rate path as for the Type One appreciation shown in
Chart 2 (also pictured), which allows us to compare
the effects of equal-size currency appreciations that
differ only with respect to their underlying causes.
The solid lines show the effects of the commodity-
price increase; the dashed lines show the effects of the
decline in the risk premium on Canadian assets.
Panel A shows the time path of the underlying shock
to the risk premium, a significant decrease that persists
for two years; Panel B shows the effect on the nominal
exchange rate, an initial path identical to that for the
Type One appreciation. Panels C and D show the
path of exports—commodity exports are only slightly
affected because the Canadian-dollar appreciation has
little or no effect on the world prices of these products
(expressed in U.S. dollars). In contrast, the apprecia-
tion of the Canadian dollar clearly hampers economic48 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2005
H. Core inﬂation G. Nominal policy interest rate
D. Manufactured exports C. Commodity exports
Chart 3
Type One and Type Two Appreciations Compared
A. Risk premium B. Nominal exchange rate (Can$ price of foreign currency)
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prospects for exporters of manufactured products.
Total exports fall in Panel E, and this reduction con-
tributes to a slump in GDP, and thus the opening of a
negative output gap, as seen in Panel F. This negative
output gap implies a state of excess supply. Monetary
policy responds to this shock by lowering the target
for the overnight interest rate (Panel G), but a reduc-
tion in core CPI inﬂation still occurs (Panel H) for a lit-
tle over two years.
The Ongoing Challenge for
Monetary Policy
While changes in the exchange rate become apparent
almost instantly, it is not easy to determine what events
are causing the change. And here lies the central policy
challenge, for without identifying the cause of the
change, it is not possible to determine the net effect on
aggregate demand and thus the appropriate policy
response. This challenge is frequently made even more
difficult by the simultaneous occurrence of several
shocks, so that an observed movement in the exchange
rate may have more than one driving source. In such a
situation, opposing forces would likely be acting on
Canadian aggregate demand, and the task for the
Bank would be to determine the relative importance
of each force.
Consider a hypothetical, but realistic, example. Suppose
the economic environment in Canada—including tax-
ation, regulation, productivity growth, and inﬂation—
improves in such a way that Canada is viewed as
being a more favourable location in which ﬁrms can
invest and operate. This improvement could lead to
two different shocks for the Canadian economy. First,
foreign or multinational firms may choose to locate
more of their productive facilities or head offices in
Canada, and they may bring the financial capital nec-
essary to ﬁnance the construction of such facilities.
The resulting inﬂow of ﬁnancial capital will cause an
appreciation of the Canadian dollar, and the new con-
struction will represent new investment in physical
capital. This is a Type One appreciation of the Cana-
dian dollar, as there is a direct positive effect on aggre-
gate demand. Second, global investors would choose
to rebalance their portfolios towards Canadian ﬁnan-
cial assets. The inﬂow of ﬁnancial capital used to
make such purchases would lead to an appreciation
of the Canadian dollar, but there would be no direct
effect on Canadian aggregate demand. This is a Type
Two appreciation. In this example,  the Canadian dol-
lar would likely appreciate in response to both Type
One and Type Two forces, and the task for monetary
policy would be complicated by the need to determine
the relative contribution to the overall appreciation
from each force.
An example from recent history
Consider how the distinction between Type One and
TypeTwoexchangeratechangescanbeusedtointerpret
economic developments and the Bank of Canada’s
policy actions during 2003 and 2004, a time when the
Canadian dollar appreciated sharply against the U.S.
dollar. Both types of exchange rate movements appear
to have been operating during this period, although
their relative importance shifted over time, as shown
in Chart 4.
In 2003, the Canadian dollar appreciated against the
U.S. dollar by just under 20 per cent, from below 65 cents
(US) in January to over 75 cents (US) in December.
What caused this appreciation? Real non-energy com-
modity prices increased by about 12 per cent, a clear
Type One force. At the same time, the U.S. dollar
weakened against the currencies of all major countries
(including other large commodity importers) by
roughly 15 per cent, suggesting the presence of
powerful Type Two forces. Net exports made a signiﬁ-
cant negative contribution to Canada’s economic
growth in 2003, and this slowdown is consistent with
the possibility that Type Two forces were dominant at
that time. The Bank’s decision to reduce its target for
Chart 4
Two Forces Behind Movements
in the Canadian Dollar
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the overnight interest rate in early 2004 might be
explained by the prospect that this slowdown in net
exports was expected to continue.
By the late summer of 2004, however, rising world
commodity prices and fast-growing world demand
had been a key feature of the economic environment
for several months. Though the U.S. dollar continued
to weaken during this period, net exports made a sub-
stantial positive contribution to Canadian GDP growth
in the ﬁrst half of 2004. These developments are con-
sistent with Type One forces playing the dominant
role. With the Canadian economy fast approaching its
capacity limits, the Bank of Canada raised its policy
interest rate in September.
Not all changes in the exchange rate
are created equal. The cause of any
given change is as important for
monetary policy as the change itself.
Late in 2004, however, the balance of economic forces
shifted again, with an increase in the relative impor-
tance of Type Two factors. The U.S. dollar weakened
sharply against all the major ﬂoating currencies, and
the Canadian dollar appreciated to a 13-year high of
over 85 cents (US). This appreciation occurred despite
a decline in commodity prices and a weakening outlook
for global economic growth. Thus, Type Two forces
were likely driving the strength in the Canadian dollar,
offsetting the neutral or even negative Type One
forces. The Bank left its target for the overnight rate
constantatthetimeofitsDecember2004policydecision.
(By July 2005, the Bank’s target for the overnight rate
was still at the level from October 2004, unchanged for
nine months.)
Conclusion
Not all changes in the exchange rate are created equal.
The cause of any given change is as important for
monetary policy as the change itself. The central point
of this article has been to explain the difference between
two important types of changes to the exchange rate,
and to explain why they are associated with different
neteffectsonCanadianaggregatedemand.Determining
the cause and persistence of exchange rate changes is
an important ongoing challenge for the Bank of Canada.
But such determination is essential if the Bank is to
take the appropriate policy action, consistent with
its objective of keeping inflation low, stable, and
predictable.